Foreword

When I wrote this essay for my undergraduate English essay composition class in late 2024, I found myself grappling with a question that feels increasingly urgent: how do we reckon with America’s post-9/11 foreign policy decisions?

This essay argues that the Iraq War accelerated America’s decline in global influence and legitimacy, not necessarily through military defeat, but through the erosion of the very foundations that made American power potent and effective: multilateral cooperation, respect for international law, and moral authority.

I’m sharing this piece because these questions feel more relevant than ever. What began as escalating tensions between Israel and Iran in 2024, following Israel’s killing of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders and Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes, has now evolved into a war between Iran and Israel as of June 2025. Iran’s supreme leader has explicitly warned that any U.S. military involvement would cause “irreparable damage,” (whatever that means for common folk) while concerns mount that these attacks are hardening Iranian resolve to develop nuclear weapons. Interestingly, it all feels very well orchestrated. That in fact, America is not a crumbling hegemonic empire but rather has been biding its time for the past decade. We may be witnessing the continuation of a grand strategy that began with Bush’s “axis of evil” doctrine over two decades ago. After what appears to be a deliberate strategy of weakening Russia through the prolonged Ukraine conflict, Iran, the second member of that original axis, now seems squarely in America’s crosshairs, with North Korea and China potentially waiting in the wings. The pattern feels eerily familiar.

Understanding how we got here, and what lessons we can draw from America’s foreign policy, seems crucial for anyone trying to make sense of our current moment, and perhaps anticipate where this trajectory leads.

This essay was written for an academic audience, but the implications extend beyond the practical essay writing exercise. Whether you agree with my conclusion or not (in hindsight, I have a touch of skepticism about it too), I hope it contributes to the ongoing conversation about America’s role in the world and the true costs of empire.

A Crisis of American Legitimacy and Influence in a Post-Iraq Reality

United States foreign policy has long rested on the bedrock belief in American exceptionalism. This belief is bolstered in part by U.S. policymakers’ endeavors to facilitate a growing hegemonic empire by championing, what America considers to be superior moral and economic characteristics under the guise of spreading democracy and freedom around the globe. One way America disseminates its ideals is through military force against weaker nation-states. This method is not uncharacteristic of an imperial power, as Chalmers Johnson, an American political scientist, surmised: “it must pretend that its exploitation of the weak is in their own best interest, or their own fault…anything but deliberate aggression by a hyperpower” (Rose). Simply put, Chalmers means to say that America must portray itself as a force for good and shroud its imperial objectives to dissuade other countries from challenging American interests. This veil, so to speak, has been lifted at a critical turning point following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. What lies under this veil is a crumbling empire whose downfall is propelled by over-extension in a conflict that was predicated on the dubious success of a previous attempt at establishing the free-market capitalist democratic nation-state of Panama for its self-interests (D’Haeseleer). While some may argue for the necessity of U.S. military power to maintain global order as a means of advancing global prosperity, I contend that the 2003 Iraq War—with its unilateral action, dismissal of international law, and devastating humanitarian consequences—accelerated America’s declining global influence and legitimacy.

America’s transition from multilateral to unilateral military intervention, which began with Operation Just Cause in Panama and reached its apex with the 2003 Iraq War, marked a significant move in U.S. foreign policy with lasting diplomatic consequences. Despite lacking broad international support compared to the previous Gulf War, the Bush administration moved swiftly to war. In doing so, the United States essentially extinguished any support that it might have rallied from other nations if the Bush administration had not acted so hastily (Fisher). Regarding Congress’ approval for the war, as Fisher notes, “By its explicit terms, the statute did not authorize war,” yet the administration proceeded regardless, eschewing the type of coalition-building that had characterized previous major military interventions (395-96). Moreover, U.S. officials simply could not ignore this fact that underpinned the failures of the Iraq invasion. As Secretary of State James Baker acknowledged, the first Gulf War succeeded precisely because it built “a broad multinational coalition” rather than relying on “a miniscule ‘coalition of the willing’"" (D’Haeseleer). The U.S. did not simply just erode diplomatic relationships with key allies but diminished its capacity to project soft power, which often serves as a force multiplier in global affairs. Legitimacy in international relations requires cooperation without coercion, yet the Bush administration’s approach weakened this strategic asset. Thus while unilateralism may have secured the short-term objective, it did so at the cost of long-term influence and global standing, and raises the question: was the immediate military objective worth the long-term diplomatic damage? I must say it was not when we consider key allies who have historically supported America, like Britain and France. Both of these countries opposed the war, and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution “‘strongly’ [deploring] the intervention and demanded an immediate withdrawal of US forces”, (D’Haeseleer). Interestingly enough, the fact that Britain and France were markedly involved in the 1991 Gulf War underscores how alienating America’s later decision to invade proved to be. In other words, this departure from multilateralism ultimately eroded the diplomatic capital and alliance networks that had historically enhanced American power on the international stage.

Yet, while proponents justified the Iraq invasion by citing weapons of mass destruction, circumventing UN resolutions set a dangerous precedent that military success could override legal constraints on the use of force. To understand just how significant this undermining of international law was, consider that Nicholas Kerton-Johnson, the Loy Chair of Political Science at Taylor University, states that “the vast majority of references to the UN were not in defense of, but rather were threatening of, the UN” (110). Bush says, “For the sake of keeping the peace, we want you to be effective … You can show the world whether you’ve got the backbone necessary to enforce your edicts or whether you’re going to turn out to be just like the League of Nations” (Kerton-Johnson). While he makes an effort to show the frustration of the United States, he also explicitly announces America’s resolve to go to war: “The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours” (Kerton-Johnson). What makes this particularly troubling is that while the U.S. did not explicitly break international law, the justifications laid out by Bush to the UN were meant to distort or create a “realignment of international law and norms” (Kerton-Johnson). In other words, Bush deliberately set the US in opposition to the UN by issuing an ultimatum to the largest international organization in the world: align with U.S. interests or the U.S. shall take unilateral action accordingly (Kerton-Johnson). Furthermore, many of Bush’s justifications centered around a clear moral dichotomy that cast America as the sole nation for good against the evil of terrorism (Kerton-Johnson). The implications of this approach were far-reaching: not only has America set a dangerous precedent for other members of the UN Security Council, but it also suggested that the notion of ‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ in international security is defined by American interests rather than UN consensus. Moreover, Bush sought to dismiss UN resolutions and laws by portraying them as the obstacles to America’s self-appointed mission of spreading the American brand of freedom. Ultimately, when American interests were positioned as superior to international law, the Bush administration fundamentally changed the dynamics between national sovereignty and global governance.

The United State’s attempt at military intervention in Iraq transformed what was meant to be a campaign of `liberation’ into a humanitarian catastrophe funded by American taxpayers. The human toll was both immediate and devastating — according to “reliable estimates by independent organizations, more civilians died in the first month of the war than were killed in the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. A five-week investigation by the Associated Press reported 3,240 civilian deaths between March 20 and April 20, 2003, including 1,896 in Baghdad alone” (Savoy). Outspoken defenders of the Iraq invasion may argue that human collateral is inevitable during a military intervention to ensure a free, democratic, and pluralist Iraq, but the staggering death toll in the first month of the conflict is an irreprehensible and unconscionable tragedy that no abstract promise of democracy could ever justify, especially given America’s imperial intentions. Even more troubling is that, as Paul Savoy notes, ”killing even one innocent person to benefit others violates the most basic human rights — the right to life” (Savoy). Indeed, not only did the invasion result in massive civilian casualties, but it also failed to deliver on its promise of a democratic, free, and tolerant Iraq. Instead, the US military deliberately undermined basic infrastructure and communications networks, leaving 5 million Iraqis isolated and terrified (Rose). The humanitarian cost is not solely on innocent Iraqi civilians, but also on the impoverished in America. Defense contractors like Lockheed Martin reaped massive profits, receiving $25 billion in taxpayer funds in 2005 alone (Rose). Much of this money could have been used to address domestic economic needs at the time. Instead, the emphasis on foreign corporatization created what Colonel Thomas Hammes of the Marine Corps grimly describes as “a couple hundred thousand people who are armed…who have no future, who have a reason to be angry” (Rose). In the end, this ‘liberation’ mission morphed into a grotesque display of corporate profiteering and military hubris that left Iraq shattered, while American tax dollars lined the pockets of defense contractors.

Throughout its recent history, particularly post-WWII, U.S. foreign policy has relied on the carefully crafted narrative of spreading democracy and maintaining global order for those who cannot do so themselves. Although some may argue that the 2003 Iraq War was necessary to combat terrorism and promote freedom, the evidence suggests otherwise. The sudden move to unilateral action, combined with the dismissal of international law, and the humanitarian toll revealed a deeper issue: a crumbling empire advanced by overreach and imperial motives. These findings matter because they highlight the long-term consequences of prioritizing self-interest over international cooperation. In Bush’s State of the Union address, he calls for the establishment of a `New World Order’, and defines the United State’s role as the torch bearer for the ideals of this global vision (Kerton-Johnson). However, as the global community grows increasingly skeptical of American leadership, the United States faces the new challenge of where it stands in a post-Iraq reality. In sum, if the U.S. fails to align its policies with multilateral principles, it risks further eroding its legitimacy and influence on the world stage.

References

[1] D’Haeseleer, Brian. “Paving the Way for Baghdad: The US Invasion of Panama, 1989.” The International History Review, vol. 41, no. 6, 2 Nov. 2019, pp. 1194-1215, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1480512.

[2] Fisher, Louis. “Deciding on War against Iraq: Institutional Failures.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, 2003, pp. 389-410. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/30035781.

[3] Kerton-Johnson, Nicholas. Justifying America’s Wars: The Conduct and Practice of US Military Intervention. Routledge, 2011. Contemporary Security Studies.

[4] Rose, Jarrett Robert. “Blowback: The American Military Empire, ‘Freemarket’ Globalization, the Iraq Wars, and the Rise of Islamic State.” 2015. San Diego State University, M.A. thesis. ProQuest, https://login.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/blowback-american-military-empire-freemarket/docview/1771508908/se-2?accountid=14701.

[5] Savoy, P. “The Moral Case against the Iraq War.” The Nation, vol. 278, no. 21, 31 May 2004, pp. 16-20.